The world of marxist philosophy

下面为大家整理一篇优秀的assignment代写范文- The world of marxist philosophy，供大家参考学习，这篇论文讨论了马克思主义哲学的世界。在马克思主义哲学的世界理论中，自在世界是相对的，事实上并不存在一个独立于人化世界以外、与人类实践无关的自在世界。整个世界和人化世界就终极意义上而言实质是同一个世界。与此相对应的是，并不存在绝对独立于已知以外的未知、绝对独立于改变世界以外的解释世界、绝对独立于实践辩证法以外的客观辩证法、以及绝对独立于历史唯物主义以外的辩证唯物主义。

Advocated the "world" of marxist philosophy is "the world" said: "human world" is just a part of "the world" trivial, outside the "humanization" world forever was not a humanized "free world", this is not the "free world" humanization is humanized world "the basis and prerequisite for the existence and development, so the study of marxist philosophy of the" world "should be including this part of the" free world ", "the world". The school mainly cites "dialectics is nothing more than a science about the general laws of nature, human society and the movement and development of thought" pointed out by Engels in his anti-dulin treatise. On the other side, the argument against this is mainly based on Marx's syllogism. The first is from the manuscript of philosophy and economics of 1844. "nature, abstractly understood, for its own sake, and determined to be separate from man, is also nothing to man." In the second paragraph, "the main defect of all previous materialism is that the object, reality and sensibility are understood only in the form of objects or intuitions, and not as the activities of sensible human beings, or as practices, but not as subjects". If there were no industry and commerce, where would there be natural science? Even this' pure 'natural science is achieved only by commerce and industry, by the sensuous activity of men, to their own ends and materials. This activity, this continual Labour of the senses, this creation, this production, is the foundation of the whole existing sensible world. Based on the analysis of the syllogism above, "humanization" world, points out that Marx's understanding of object, reality, perceptual must be put in practice to understand, so marxist philosophy refers to "the world", the reality of "humanization" world, out of the scope of human practice of "free world" even objective existence does not belong to the object of study of marxist philosophy. For example, some scholars believe that the nature we are facing is generated by practice or connected with practice in one way or another. Nature, apart from practice, exists but has no meaning for human beings. Some hold that people can study the dialectical movement of nature and thinking independently, but these individual dialectical movements cannot represent the overall nature of marxist dialectics. For these are objects of science, not of meta-philosophy. Some scholars believe that marxist philosophy is essentially human philosophy and social philosophy, and the world it involves is the real world. Therefore, only within the scope of human society can there be philosophical problems to speak of. As for nature, which is outside society and has nothing to do with man, it is nothing to man and philosophy, and does not belong to the sphere of philosophical study.

"The whole world school" does not agree with the above explanation of "humanized world school", and thinks that if "the in-itself world" is excluded from the view of marxist philosophy according to the latter's proposition, it will inevitably lead to subjective idealism. It points out that Marx did say in the German ideology that "sensible Labour" is "the basis of the whole existing sensible world", but then points out that "in this case, of course, the primacy of external nature remains". In other words, while emphasizing the foundation of "perceptual labor" on the whole existing perceptual world, Marx did not deny the priority of nature, but still "admitted that there are places on the earth that have nothing to do with human practice". Secondly, although Marx emphasizes the understanding of objects, reality and sensibility from the practical aspect in outline, it only points out the shortcomings of intuitive materialism, rather than denying intuitive materialism fundamentally and opposing the understanding of the world from the object aspect fundamentally. As for Marx, "nature, abstractly understood, for its own sake, as defined as separate from man, is also absent from man." This is to be understood in context, and this "nature apart from man" refers specifically to nature in Hegel's context. If some scholars believe that the role of practice is very great, there would be no earth civilization today without practice, but the role of practice has now stopped here, the world beyond the earth, practice can do nothing about it, even for the nearest moon, human just left some footprints. Even today, there is no fully humanized part of the earth's surface. Therefore, humanized nature is not the whole nature, but an insignificant part of nature. Some scholars believe that it is not only idealistic but also metaphysical to relegate the impersonal in-itself world to a meaningless subgenre. The result is bound to be that "human practice and cognition are always trapped in the abstract category of practice, unable to advance half an inch".

In fact, the arguments on both sides unconsciously acquiesced to the potential premise of binary opposition, that is, there exists an unknown "in-itself world" independent of the "humanized world", which has nothing to do with human practice. Differences between the two sides is: only one side as the "world" of marxist philosophical research should include this as a prerequisite of "humanization" world "free world", the other party thought the out of the "free world" of human practice, although exist, but for the marxist philosophy is pointless, it can only be the object of empirical science. Therefore, the only fundamental way to bridge the gap between the two sides is to ask whether there is, philosophically speaking, an unknown "in-itself world" that is independent of the "humanized world" and completely irrelevant to human practice. Let's start with the premise that both parties agree on. Since philosophers claim that an "unknown" "in-itself" is objectively "existing", do not the "unknown" and "being" themselves constitute the philosophers' first and most general philosophical definition of this "in-itself"? That is to say, once people form the concept of "in-itself world" in the concept, the so-called "in-itself world" is not absolutely "in-itself" for philosophy, because it has already constituted the object of people's thinking and has been thought philosophically. However, people's philosophical thinking can never come out of nowhere, and it can only come from practice in the final analysis, because "all the mysterious things that lure theory into mysticism can be reasonably solved in human practice and the understanding of such practice." Regarding this question, some domestic scholars have carried on the elaboration from the ontology Angle, has obtained the similar conclusion. His point of view is that it is doubtful whether there is a way of asking questions in nature without practice, which is the way of asking questions in the old ontology philosophy. For it is impossible to ask such a question before man came into being, and impossible to answer the question of whether nature exists without practice after man came into being.

Thus it can be seen that there is in essence always a relationship between man and the "in-itself world" between knowledge and being known and transformation and transformation, that is, the relationship between practice. To this question, professor lu jianjie's argument in his book historical and logical analysis of theoretical system of practical materialism published in 1994 is quite enlightening. He believed that the real world of human beings could be divided into three circles, namely, the circle of practice, the circle of observation and the circle of thinking. Among them, the "circle of thinking" can be regarded as the "in-itself world", which is the object of human thinking, so it has an indirect relation with human practice. From this point of view, we can understand from another perspective that "nature, which is abstractly understood, for its own sake, and determined to be separated from man, is also nothing to man". It should be noted that there is a debate in academia as to whether this sentence is Marx's own opinion or Marx's quote from Hegel. However, no matter who holds the opinion, it is certain that Marx's attitude towards abstraction is divided into two parts. He opposes Hegel's idealist abstraction that dominates everything with the absolute idea, while he fully affirms the scientific abstraction that is based on perceptual practice. So for people temporarily not directly involved in the practice of the objective nature, human beings can only through scientific abstract thinking to see, although this part of the nature exists in the form of abstract, but the content is objective, but the understanding of it is based on the abstract on the basis of practice, so it is with Hegel's type of abstract nature has essential difference. On the contrary, if the people temporarily not directly involved in the practice of that part of the nature understood as nothing to do with the practice of the people of the so-called pure nature, but the initiative to abandon the practice point of view, and made from realistic to abstract to understand this part of the nature of errors, which originally the nature of reality is understood as abstraction.

The above analysis is carried out from the perspective of knowledge and being known, from the perspective of transformation and being transformed, we can still reach the same conclusion. Take the relationship between man and nature as an example. "Nature in itself" indirectly supports human's current practice activities. As Marx said, "nature, in so far as it is not a human body, is an inorganic human body". Nature is an intrinsically connected whole. Although most of the natural world is not the direct object of human practice, it constitutes the realistic conditions for human practice and is the supporting foundation for human practice to be carried out. From the perspective of diachronic relations, human beings would not have evolved from the nature without human beings. Therefore, there is an indirect and inevitable relationship between the nature before human beings and human practices today. Human practice activity today, on the other hand, also for the future of nature, the universe space also hardly falls within the scope of object of human practice, even in the human practice within the scope of object of the object, its internal structure and properties there are still a lot of is not the direct object of human practice, and only had close relations with the object of the "free world", but all of this "free world", they are not the direct object of human practice, but is not the same as they had nothing to do with human practice, they are more or less, or far or near, are associated with human practice, It is a necessary condition for the development of human practice. Without the support of the "in-world" such as the universe, the earth's core and crust, and the internal structure and properties of practical objects, the objects of human practice are not dependent on each other, and human practice is out of the question. Current practices of human activities, on the other hand, although not directly for space object, the core of the earth's crust, internal structure, and properties such as the role of the immediate reality "free world", but the current practice of objects as a part in the whole world to the "free world" also plays a supporting function in the reverse, so the role of human to the current object, namely humanized world "practice, essentially the" free world "the role of the support system, which is the indirect role of" free world ".

From the above analysis, it can be seen that the "in-itself world" is relative both philosophically and practically, and there is no absolute "in-itself world" completely independent of the "humanized world" and completely unrelated to human practice. Once we break through the binary opposition of "in-itself world" and "humanized world" on both sides of the argument, then "humanized world" and "in-itself world" are essentially worlds related to practice, that is, worlds directly related to practice and worlds indirectly related to practice. Therefore, the world related to practice, that is, the "humanized world" in the broad sense, is actually "the whole world".

The whole world school maintains that the mission of marxist philosophy is to reveal the universal law of the whole world. It holds that marxist philosophy is the only scientific world view, which provides a scientific picture of the whole material world. Dialectical materialism's view on the materiality of the world and the general law of the world's development is the true revelation of the external world itself. Modern science has repeatedly shown that the world is indeed in universal connection and eternal motion, as revealed by marxist philosophy. "Humanization" world argues that "the world" is no a scientific concept or system can fully grasp, to reveal the general rule of "the world" as the mission of marxist philosophy, is a kind of unrealistic expectations of marxist philosophy, marxist philosophy, it will bring into the traditional "the science of science", to return to the camp of western traditional philosophy. Some scholars point out that "' the whole world 'is an undefined and infinite object, and no science can study it, nor can philosophy as a science take it as an object, or it will become a non-scientific abstract speculation". Another said, "modern science has shown from the very beginning that the 'whole world', as the sum of nature, human society and thought, cannot be grasped by any scientific or conceptual system." But it also acknowledges that "any kind of science studies the whole world in one way or another."

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