America's coercive diplomacy

下面为大家整理一篇优秀的assignment代写范文- America's coercive diplomacy，供大家参考学习，这篇论文讨论了美国的强制外交。在美国外交政策中，作为武力威胁和有限武力运用的表现形式，威慑在冷战时期占据主导地位，而强制外交在后冷战时期则十分醒目。苏联解体后，美国凭着世界上唯一超级大国地位，独自或者与其他盟国一道频频运用强制外交，实现其对外政策目标。在加强强制外交行动的同时，美国官员也愈来愈多地使用强制外交概念。

In the foreign policy of the United States, as a form of threat of force and limited use of force, "deterrence" dominated in the cold war period, while coercive diplomacy was very prominent in the post-cold war period. After the collapse of the Soviet union, the United States, relying on its status as the world's only superpower, frequently used coercive diplomacy alone or with other Allies to achieve its foreign policy objectives. For example, during the crisis in Haiti from 1991 to 1994, the United States forced the military government of cederas to return power to aristide, the elected President; 1998-1999 forced the yugoslav federation to cease military strikes against kosovo Albanian separatist forces and accept western peace agreements; From 2002 to 2003, forced Iraqi President saddam hussein to step down and completely give up weapons of mass destruction, etc. At the same time of strengthening compulsory diplomatic action, American officials also more and more use of coercive diplomacy concepts, for example, the early stage of the Clinton administration secretary of defense William ? perry had claimed, Haiti's military junta in 1994 under the threat of force were forced to return power to an elected President, is an example of the use of "coercive diplomacy". In March 2003, President bush asked congress to approve an emergency additional appropriation of $74.7 billion, with the defense department specifying that $30.3 billion of the funds it needed would go to coercive diplomacy.

At present, coercive diplomacy has become an important foreign policy tool for American decision-makers, and thus an important object of study for American international relations and strategic theory. Based on the elaboration of the theory of coercive diplomacy in the United States, this paper analyzes the factors influencing the success or failure of coercive diplomacy.

The contemporary concept of "coercive diplomacy" is mainly derived from the term "coercion". In the 1960s, Thomas schelling, a professor of international politics at Harvard University in the United States, coined the term "coercion", one of the first to distinguish clearly between "coercion" and "deterrence". In his view, the measure to prevent the other party from taking action before it does so is deterrence, and the measure to force it to cease and eliminate action after it has been taken is coercion; The purpose of deterrence is to prevent the enemy from doing something, while the purpose of coercion is to make the other party do something. This classification has been widely used in western strategic research circles.

In the early 1970s, Alexander L. George used the word "coercive diplomacy" to replace schelling's concept of "coercion." In his opinion, the two connotations are not exactly the same. Coercive diplomacy is the use of threats and/or limited force to persuade other actors to cease and/or eliminate an action that has been undertaken. He believed that schelling's concept of "coercion" could not well distinguish the use of coercive threats for attack and defense, and implied a complete or severe reliance on the threat of force, ignoring the flexibility of coercive diplomacy. The offensive use of coercive threats is "blackmail", while the defensive use of coercive threats is "coercive diplomacy". In reality, however, it is often difficult to draw a strict distinction between the two. If one side demands that the other give up some or all of its own territory, as Hitler did with Austria and Czechoslovakia, it is certainly blackmail. But if one side demands that the other give up not its own territory but something else, such as a policy, it is difficult to determine whether blackmail is possible. George believed that in order to force the west to change its policy towards Berlin and Germany, the Soviet union proposed in November 1958 to end the occupation system of Berlin within six months, and demanded that the west conclude the peace treaty with Germany without delay at the Vienna conference in June 1961, which was blackmail. It is somewhat subjective to regard the above actions of the Soviet union as blackmail. In fact, when it comes to how to deal with Berlin and Germany, the Soviet union, the United States and other western countries all strive to achieve their own strategic intentions based on their own interests.

George's definition of coercive diplomacy is not necessarily defensive, as he says. In judging the offensive and defensive nature of coercive diplomacy, he confuses motives with goals. An agent may have a complex political motive behind persuading an opponent to stop doing something, eliminate an action, etc., that is offensive or both offensive and defensive. In particular, George's "C" type of coercive diplomacy, in which "opponents are required to change the composition of their government or the nature of their regime to bring an end to hostilities", is hardly defensive. He also acknowledged that this type of coercive diplomacy "may blur the distinction between defensive and offensive use of threats." As Lawrence Freed -- man, a professor at the royal college of London, pointed out, changing the governments of other countries is a challenge to the basic sovereignty of the country. If such a goal is defensive, it is impossible to distinguish between defensive and offensive targets. "The insistence on coercive diplomacy is defensive, untenable in practice and useless from a theoretical perspective," he said. In fact, many scholars regard "coercive diplomacy" and "coercion" as two terms with the same connotation. Even George himself often equates the two terms.

The threat of force by one country to force another to take an action is an international political phenomenon that has long existed in history, not a product of modernity. Since schelling clearly distinguished it from deterrence, some scholars in today's American academic world still use the term schelling coined to refer to it as "coercion". Some scholars took George's name and called it "coercive diplomacy." "There has been little consensus over the past 30 years on terms like 'coercive,' 'coercive diplomacy,' and 'bullying,'" said Gary Schaub. He believes that if there is consensus on common terms in international relations, scholars will be able to find and synthesize the research results of their peers, which will greatly promote the research on this topic. Robert S. Ross also noted the confusion, but felt that "coercive diplomacy" was a more familiar term than "coercion."

Scholars have different views on the coercive means that coercive diplomacy can use. The existing definition of coercive diplomacy can be roughly divided into two categories: one defines coercive diplomacy as the threat of force rather than the actual use of force. For example, Mark R. Amstutz argues that coercive diplomacy is the use of military threats to persuade actors to change behavior. Eric Herring argues that coercion is the threat of force by A to force B to do something, not the use of force by A to get there. Another definition holds that the threat of force or limited force can be used in coercive diplomacy. For example: Alexander George thinks, coercive diplomacy strategy refers to the threat or limited use of force to persuade the country to cancel or eliminate certain aggressive behavior. Charles W. Kegley and Gregory A. Raymond thinks, coercive diplomacy refers to threat or limited use of force, to persuade the other ? countries this will not take action.

In the first definition, if a coercive state actually USES any force after making a threat of force, it marks the failure of coercive diplomacy. For example, on 1 August 1995, NATO, led by the United States, threatened to use "substantial and decisive air power" to demand that bosnian serb forces cease their offensive against sarajevo and other safe areas. But on August 28th a market in sarajevo was shelled, killing more than 100 people. On 30 August, NATO began bombing bosnian serb army positions. On 20 November, the bosnian serbs were forced to accept the Dayton peace agreement. According to the first definition, the bombing operation carried out by NATO countries between August 30, solstice and November 20 goes beyond the scope of coercive diplomacy, which means that coercive diplomacy fails. In the second definition, coercive diplomacy can actually use limited force, that is, punitive or symbolic use of a limited amount of force "to provide credibility to the threat that more force will be used when necessary." When a coercive state USES limited force, it still leaves the adversary the choice of obedience or resistance. By contrast, war or total force is the direct acquisition or destruction of a target through large-scale and intense military action. However, even scholars who insist on the second definition believe that the threat of force is the most important means of coercive diplomacy. Under the second definition, NATO's coercive diplomacy against the bosnian serbs has finally won.

From the mainstream point of view of American theoretical circles, coercive diplomacy can be defined as: one country influences the decision of another country to do something by threatening to use force and/or actually using limited force -- to stop the action being taken, or to eliminate the action already taken, or to engage in other actions expected by the coercive state.

Coercive diplomacy provides coercive states with the possibility of achieving a given goal in a crisis without much cost, without bloodshed, or with little bloodshed. At the same time, a forced diplomatic solution to the crisis would do less damage to future bilateral relations than a war. On the other hand, war, as a means of safeguarding national interests, is increasingly restricted by international law and public opinion. In addition, recourse to war is costly. Therefore, coercive diplomacy has certain appeal to policy makers. But coercive diplomacy has its limits. Precisely because it has the effect of "subjugation without war" or of achieving goals cheaply, it may sometimes tempt the leaders of powerful military powers to think that they can intimidate weak states into complying with demands without risking much. But a weak military might have a very strong incentive to resist coercion because the stakes are so high that the strong military must decide whether to retreat or escalate the crisis into a military confrontation. Therefore, George pointed out that a country's coercive diplomacy would be very risky if it was not ready for actual combat. As in many cases in bosnia, failure to honour previous threats of force undermines the reputation of powerful states and makes it harder to make effective threats in the future. It should be noted that coercive diplomacy is only one of the instruments for dealing with international crises or conflicts and is often very risky. In some environments, coercive diplomacy has been successful, while in others, it may be ineffective or inappropriate.

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