服务承诺
资金托管
原创保证
实力保障
24小时客服
使命必达
51Due提供Essay,Paper,Report,Assignment等学科作业的代写与辅导,同时涵盖Personal Statement,转学申请等留学文书代写。
51Due将让你达成学业目标
51Due将让你达成学业目标
51Due将让你达成学业目标
51Due将让你达成学业目标私人订制你的未来职场 世界名企,高端行业岗位等 在新的起点上实现更高水平的发展
积累工作经验
多元化文化交流
专业实操技能
建立人际资源圈Was_Germany_Mostly_Responsible_for_the_Onset_of_the_Great_War_
2013-11-13 来源: 类别: 更多范文
Origins of the Great War
Of all the European belligerents in 1914, was Germany mostly responsible for the onset of the Great War'
The Great War was a global military conflict that involved all the great European powers, primarily conflicting between two great alliances, as both sides fought to maintain the ‘balance of power’ in Europe. The war had been brought about by a web of secret diplomatic dealings, a complex and rigid military and political alliance system and a spiralling arms race. The war had disastrous results, unimagined before 1914, and there was a complete collapse of the European economy and industry. But the question that remained and is still being questioned, was who was responsible for the onset of the war, which country had unleashed those four catastrophic years we now know as the World War I.
Post war the Versailles peace treaty of 1919, stated unequivocally that Germany was solely responsible for the onset of the Great War and that they were to blame for all the loss and damage to which the other countries were subjected, as a consequence of which Germany had to compensate heavily. Yet, after years of research historians have come up with numerous alternative explanations to many pre-war activities, diplomatic dealings and ideas shared by each country, which provide a clearer explanation of each country’s involvement in the bringing about and culmination of the Great War. It is most commonly believed that Germany was mostly responsible for the onset of the war, but alternative justifications can be explored as well.
The other powers, namely France, Britain and Russia, believed that there might have been various other reasons that had been accumulating over the years and gradually building up tension amongst the European countries, such as the Moroccan Crises’, the Balkans War, growing imperialism across the world that brought about competition and instability etc. but that the war was mainly triggered by Germany’s final act of total encouragement to Austria in proceeding with her plan of attacking Serbia. As suggested in Source B, Germany, in her ambition to control Europe, grow in influence and power, her desperation for world dominance, was ready to embark on any kind of scheme to protect her position as the predominant world power, and attain supremacy. It was also believed that Germany had been planning this war all along, to compete against the emerging powers in Europe. Neither power was ready to experience German domination within Europe and hence they became allies and helped fight against Germany.
After the assassination of the Austrian Archduke, Franz Ferdinand, by a group of Siberian terrorists, in fury Austria had decided to give them an ultimatum for which they sought support from it’s biggest ally, Germany. As suggested in Sources D and I, at that most crucial moment that defined the course of the war, Germany had the power to make a decision, whether to stop Austria from attacking Siberia and instead negotiating with them, or to give them the ‘Blank Cheque’ - encourage them and promise unconditional support - to which they did the latter and this is believed to have triggered off the war, as Austria launched a full scale attack on Siberia to humiliate them seek revenge. According to the opposition, Germany should not have gone through with this as it was then inevitable that Russia would have to join in to back Siberia and eventually the other allies would get pulled in and it would result in a full scale generalised European war.
Other mistakes on Germany’s part were, the continuity of Germany’s world policy, their persistent efforts at trying to rise to hegemony, this Britain saw as the Kaiser’s short-sighted policy. They also highly disregarded the Schlieffen Plan, Belgium had pledged neutrality and yet Germany invaded France by passing through Belgium even after not receiving consent to do so. Also, as implied in Source C, France had never recently made an advance towards Germany for annexation, though they held the grudge of losing Alsace and Lorraine to them during the Franco-Prussian war, the fact that Germany attacked France in a pre-emptive strike, without any sort of warning, put all the blame on Germany. Germany should have known all along that attacking one of the allies of the opposition power bloc would mean the involvement of the other allies too. It was believed too that Germany’s encirclement was self-imposed, it could have been overcome easily by peaceful foreign policies, but that never dawned on the general staff manager, as they were too absorbed in the rise and fall of world empires.
Whereas on the other hand Germany refused to accept sole responsibility for the onset of the war and claimed instead that they were fighting a defensive war. They clearly denied the accusation of having planned this war beforehand and unleashing it onto the other countries now. Germany claimed that they were innocent and that no single nation brought about the war, it was a series of miscalculations and bad decisions on everyone’s part. Since the establishment of the German Empire, they had lived in peace and maintained a fair balance in Europe and possibly their growing strength and power had aroused envy from the other developing powers in Europe, determined to bring them down, as suggested in Source A.
Germany’s decision to support and encourage Austria against Siberia was centred around Siberia’s aggression against Austria, they believed that after the astonishing assassination of Franz Ferdinand, Russia too would be appalled and hence refuse to back Siberia against Germany and Austria and so this would have been an Austro-Siberian conflict, without the involvement of any other great powers. But Germany was caught by surprise when Russia began partial mobilisation to back Siberia, this came as a big threat to Germany as expressed in Source E, Russian mobilisation meant war, which led to them having to mobilise their troops to be on guard. Germany believed that Russian mobilisation precipitated the final catastrophe, the trigger cause for the onset of the war. Russia was also unwilling to negotiate with Berlin and Vienna, complete mobilisation meant disaster.
One major reason for Germany’s willingness for war was their fear of encirclement by the Triple Entente. Soon there was a decline in the Austrian military accompanied by the Russian military build up, Germany had also just lost the naval race against Britain which made them feel insecure and if they didn’t take drastic measures quickly they feared the military balance would tip decisively against them. France too was modernising rapidly and the Triple Entente was growing closer and stronger together. As Source D conveys, Germany felt extremely threatened and were hence ready to run the risk of war at the earliest possible before it’s enemies became fully developed at which point it would be impossible to beat them. Germany was now eager for war not for aggressive objectives but to regain their position of having world power. They believed war was inevitable, they just needed the right time, their moment of destiny. Domestic, political and social factors shaped their policies, Germany felt a sense of desperation, their domestic position was under threat, their world aspirations were being blocked by the encirclement and their own lack of investment capital, they needed world power to be strong domestically and internationally.
Finally, Germany also places a large part of the blame solely on Britain, namely Sir Edward Grey, Britain’s Foreign secretary, as we can see from both Sources G an H, it is believed that during his efforts of mediation and maintaining peace during the war, had Grey been clearer, more persistent and had he taken a stronger stand the seemingly inevitable war might’ve been avoided altogether. He had pledged to Germany that Britain would remain neutral in case of a European war, which was a huge assumption Germany had kept in consideration while encouraging Austria to fight against Serbia, had they known Britain would join in and support Russia and France they might not have attacked in the first place. Also if he had been firmer on his point of remaining neutral to Russia and France they too might never have gone up against Germany and Austria-Hungary. Grey’s unclear intentions led to many wrong and miscalculated judgments.
In conclusion, the crisis heightened due to military confrontations, growth of armaments and increased expectations. War was beyond the control of a single nation, there was no general will to war and no deliberate desires, though as the crisis escalated and steered out of control, the nations got too caught up and carried away. The war was inevitable and after a certain point problems both at home and abroad could no longer be settled through negotiation and diplomacy, the only alternative seen by all the countries was their national decline, and this was their greatest miscalculation. Eventually the breakdown of the balance of the power system in Europe led to pressure and catastrophe. Each country’s political and military actions led to certain conclusions in other countries, such as mobilisations and declarations of war, and each country failed to take measures, which might have avoided the seemingly inevitable war. Hence, on the most part responsibility for the war is divided and shared by each country, rather than blaming one country in particular or following the traditional view that was most commonly believed post-war, that Germany was to blame.

