德国公平化雇佣关系模式研究--Essay代写范文

Essay代写范文:“德国公平化雇佣关系模式研究”，这篇论文主要描述的是德高的高附加值经济模式一直以来都是欧洲社会所支持和认可的，德国雇佣关系的突出特点就在于高度的法制化，与欧洲的许多国家不一样的是，德国的职工代表从集体谈判制度中被分离出来独立的存在，这是一种建立在公民民主基础上的雇佣关系。

The German high value-added economy has long been the Mecca for supporters of the European social model (Grahl & Teague, 2004). The German model delivered both equity and efficiency by putting socially desirable constraints on business that stimulated investment in skills, promoted social peace and enhanced corporate performance (Streeck, 1992). This model of industrial relations is characterised by a high degree of juridification, and it is based on a ‘dual system’ of interest representation, in which workers’ representation at establishment level is separated from the collective bargaining system (Schmitt, 2003).Unlike many other countries, German employment relations is based on a duality of legally regulated works councils on the one hand, and union-based delegates on the other rather than multi-union representation (Klikauer, 2004). Collective bargaining generally takes place at sectoral and regional level between unions and employers’ associations, works councils and management are responsible for labour relations at establishment level (Schmitt, 2003). Co-determination is a distinguishing feature of employment relations in Germany. This form of employee participation in management is based on the idea of industrial democracy and originated in the Weimar Republic (Keller & Kirsch, 2011).

In contrast to other continental countries with similar structures, there is very little overlap between centralized collective bargaining and works council activities in Germany (Hassel, 1999).Works council and management are obliged by law to work together ‘in a spirit of mutual trust for the good of the employees and of the establishment’ (Jacobo et al. 1992). Germany belongs to the group of countries with intermediate levels of centralisation but comparatively high degrees of bargaining coordination within, as well as between industries (Keller & Kirsch, 2011).In this essay we are going to shed light on the recent developments in German employment relations and discuss their implications on the traditional view that ‘Germany is the prime exemplar of a CME’.

The German system of industrial relations remained surprisingly stable throughout the 1970s and 1980s, at a time when union density and influence were declining in most other industrialized countries (Doellgast & Greer, 2007). Since the 1990 and the end of cold war, the unification of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic has caused many problems (Keller & Kirsch, 2011). The combination of recession, unification and increased international competition has helped nurture an environment in which German employers are empowered with a new sense of purpose, one guided by neoliberal values (Whittall, 2005). The most visible indicator of these hard times has been declining density levels. Reliable figures for trade union membership levels are hard to obtain, but the consensus is that trade union density level has fallen from roughly 36 per cent in the earlier 1990s to about 28 per cent in 2003 (Grahl & Teague, 2004). By 2003, union membership had fallen to around eight million from the post unification peak in 1991 of 14 million (Schroeder & Wessels, 2003).

There is also a continuing decline of collective bargaining coverage and of the number of workplaces with works councils (Behrens, Fichter, & Frege, 2003).The basic cause of this decline has been employment loss in those economic sectors in which trade unions have been traditionally well represented alongside an inability of trade unions to recruit new members in sufficient numbers in those occupations and economic sectors that have been growing (Grahl & Teague, 2004).

More significant than any overall decline in collective bargaining coverage has been the trend towards decentralisation of collective bargaining (Clark & Claydon, 2007). Between 1995 and 1998 the coverage rate of West German plants shrank from 53.4 to 47.7 per cent. In East Germany the share of plants covered by a collective agreement fell from 27.6 to 25.8 per cent between 1996 and 1998 (Hassel, 2002). Union membership and collective bargaining coverage have declined, and therefore German trade unions find it more difficult to maintain pressure on employers outside of core workplaces (Doellgast & Greer, 2007). In other words, the formal structures of industry wide collective bargaining have remained intact, but its outcomes and functions have changed significantly as final decisions about substantive issues have gradually shifted to the enterprise level (Keller & Kirsch, 2011). As a consequence of decentralisation the power of managers and works councils has gradually intensified and a greater importance is attached to the works agreements. Works councils act as co-managers dealing with the requirements of the single firm. Their principal task is no longer to enforce compliance with collective agreements. As a result, employment relations at enterprise level are becoming more differentiated, depending also on differences in the balance of power or management style (Kurdelbusch, 2002).

To limit the deterioration of industry-wide collective bargaining, but also to save jobs at company level, most unions have agreed to so-called opening and hardship clauses (Behrens, Fichter, & Frege, 2003). While such clauses often provide the basis of concessions on wages and especially working hours, they also allow unions to gain control of the decentralization process by establishing elaborate approval procedures at regional or national level (Jacoby & Behrens, 2001).However, the processes through which decentralisation is taking place in Germany differ from those in other countries, and have been categorised as ‘organised’ as opposed to ‘disorganised’ decentralisation (Keller & Kirsch, 2011). In the past industry-wide pay agreements were seen as a key aspect of the German model as these helped to take wage costs out of inter firm competition and to stabilise employment relations within the firm (Ulman & Gerlach, 2003). This controlled decentralisation reflects the interests of the unions in maintaining an over-arching structure of collective bargaining (Clark & Claydon, 2007).

The role of co-determination has been strengthened by legislation that has provided stronger support for works council organisation and extended the influence of works council over training and employment protection matters (Clark & Claydon, 2007). A number of studies suggest that to meet the challenges of competitive pressure works councils are now less preoccupied with the enforcement of substantive employment rights inside the enterprise and more concerned to act as a forum for the development of corporate strategies that have the support of management and insider employees (Hassel, 1999) (Muller-Jentsch, 1995). In other words, the ‘duality’ of the German system, one of its fundamental characteristics, has gradually been weakened and disintegrating.

In particular, the high density of employers associations in terms of employment has been crucial in extending the coverage of collective agreements far beyond what trade unions acting alone could ever have accomplished. German employer’s associations have nonetheless been shrinking for two decades (Silvia & Schroeder, 2007). There is indeed room for deviation from the traditional German industrial relations as there is no legal obligation to join an employer’s association (Schmitt, 2003). The membership rates of small and medium sized enterprises have fallen off precipitously as they have found it increasingly difficult since the mid-1980s to remain profitable because of the aggressive tactics of their larger customers and some of them have negotiated single-firm contract with a trade union, which are known as “house” agreements in Germany (Silvia & Schroeder, 2007). Legally all member companies must adhere to the conditions of the collective agreements that the employer association negotiates with a union. However employer associations are finding it difficult to balance the interests of various member groups (Keller & Kirsch, 2011). In response to membership loss, some employer associations now allow companies to join and receive membership benefits such as information and legal advice without being bound to the collective agreements (membership ohne Tarifbindung, or OT) (Keller & Kirsch, 2011). The flight of small firms from employers’ associations have increased wage inequalities between the sectors and opened up a gap in regulation that previously existed at a much smaller scale (Thelen & Wijnbergen, 2003). This has resulted in German employers associations’ losing their capacity to carry out their core mission which is the determination of compensation in the labour market.

Pressures for labour market reforms along American lines have been reinforced by the diffusion of the concept of shareholder value into the German business system (Clark & Claydon, 2007). IG-Metall, until recently Germany’s largest union, has had to contend with a new economic regime, one in which shareholder value increasingly takes precedence over stakeholder interests. In trying to pacify capital as well as retain a strong influence over plant-level employee representatives, IG-Metall has implemented various measures, in particular the promotion of O¨ffnungsklauseln (Peters, 2000).German firms are becoming more open to the discipline of the stock market and influenced by the principle of shareholder value (Clark & Claydon, 2007).

】Since the early 1980s, employers and their associations have voiced demands for more ‘flexibility’. Since the 1980s there has been an encompassing trend away from the standard employment relationship (Normalarbeitsverhaltnis) that comprises full-time continuing employment and inclusion in the social insurance schemes (Keller & Kirsch, 2011).The ongoing failure to create jobs and reduce unemployment has led to growing demands within Germany for measures to increase labour market flexibility to encourage job creation, attract foreign investment and stimulate economic growth (Grahl & Teague, 2004). As in other countries atypical employment has increased and includes part-time work, petty employment, new forms of self employment, fixed-term contracts and temporary agency (Keller & Kirsch, 2011). German employers predominantly in the metal industry can now be observed pushing through measures aimed at cutting costs and improving productivity; all of which have ultimately led to a reduction in employment levels, an intensification of the labour process and greater employee differentiation (Whittall, 2005).

Remuneration practices that link workers’ pay more closely to individual and company performance have become more popular in Germany since the mid-1990s. This is regarded as one indicator of the ongoing decentralization of the German system of industrial relations (Katz & Darbishire, 2000). In such moderately centralised and highly coordinated systems of collective bargaining, wage differentials and qualification levels are relatively narrow and working conditions, particularly working time, are more standardised than in decentralised systems (Keller & Kirsch, 2011). The wage differentials and differences in living conditions have been increasing in the most recent past. Unions accept more (controlled) flexibility and variation in wages to keep industry-wide bargaining alive. The new flexibility within collective agreements contributes to the stabilization of the formal institution since the alternate would be for firms to exit from the system, in the Anglo-American style (Hassel & Rehder, 2001). The trend toward decentralization and flexibility of remuneration schemes indicated a change toward a more Anglo-American business system, but also reveals the strong embeddedness of German companies in the German system of industrial relations (Kurdelbusch, 2002).

Competitive pressures have intensified in many sectors of the German economy. In the early 1990s companies faced growing price competition and began to look for lower cost alternatives, often in partnership with worker representatives, for handling certain ‘non-core’ jobs (Doellgast & Greer, 2007).As far as the Anglo-Saxon owned subsidiaries operating in the German economy are concerned, they do not pose a threat to the traditional pillars of German industrial democracy, as it has often been assumed. They comply with the central institutions of German IR, collective bargaining and works councils, at least as much as local firms do (Schmitt, 2003). In response to increased market competition, epitomized by the European Union’s expansion eastwards, market instability, in addition to the cost of unification and persistence of high unemployment, evidence suggests that Modell Deutschland is in a state of crisis (Whittall, 2005).

结论---CONCLUSION

The continuing political support has been the single most stabilising factor in the German industrial relations. The basic legal structure of the system has been a stable body of rules which are still valid. The gradual, hesitant reform to the German system has been in every area except the area of welfare where there is strong continuing public support for Germany’s excellent welfare state provision. In a society like Germany which is institutionally dense it is unlikely for the trade unions to experience a dramatic collapse, indeed there is evidence that the unions continue to wield considerable influence. They have also launched a variety of interesting experiments to reinvigorate campaigning and mobilising activities. This expansion of Modell Deutschland’s competence, can be referred to as ‘functional conversion’ (Thelen, 2000) as its ability to react to deregulation pressures in a way that does not involve wholesale change is reflected.

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