Critical Foundations of the Contextual Philosophy of Mind--论文代写范文精选

柏拉图和亚里士多德有争议的医学领域,通过禁欲主义的传统,从康德的要点谈他的逻辑，亚里士多德逻辑补充用于具体分析。以及和物理相关，理解补充和连续性。下面的essay代写范文进行详述。

INTRODUCTION 
The burden of my argument is the simple claim that mind serves to contextualize life. The contextualizing mind is evidently exceedingly ancient presence in human history. Placement in sacred architecture and the siting of dwellings are treated in the ancient Indian Vaastu (Arya, 2000) and Chinese Feng Shui (Duane, 1997), respectively. The teaching of the Buddha called psychological situates perception in the relation of subject and object, and in this kind of spirit one should not expect Vaastu and Feng Shui to address the material environment in a mundane sense, rather the perceived or lived environment, and this in the context of the culture and its traditions. Contextual philosophy can then be expected to arise in reflection on such primordial intuitions, This is much what we see in the Epic of Gilgamesh, a saga of reawakening though a return from the city to the country-side. 

Contextual reflection is attested in the distinction between root and complement in grammar: in the paradigm case of verbal roots, this gives just activity and its context. Taking the activity as a medical intervention, one has attention to the patient's response as complementary, whence 1 what is called complementary medicine. This complex discourse addresses the organic and personal response to disease and intervention, bearing on nutrition, health education, environmental medicine and nursing. Both Plato and Aristotle contested the medical terrain, but the semantic trail leads rather through the Stoic tradition, whence Kant had the essentials of his logic (Hanna, 2004). 

Aristotle used the logical complement in his Prior Analytics (1.19-22) specifically in analyzing how the modalities of necessity and possibility affect the figures of syllogism. He also spoke in On Generation and Corruption of the complement in a physical sense with reference to the cycle of the elements and the polarities hot/cold and wet/dry, and in the Physics of related difficulties in understanding the complement and the continuum. But the formal analogy is not developed in what we have of Aristotle's writing, and the difficulties in these text reach to questions of translation from ancient Greek, so this is an area requiring intensive and specialist study. Here there remains the theme of analogy as a way with the complexities of ontology, which we encounter below in Kant (1.2). Aristotle's teaching on logic focused in the main on the forms of statement arranged in syllogisms, and in what is called the Traditional Square of Opposition. 

The logical complement then appears in modern logic only after Kant, in the algebra of Boole, and strictly applies to what are called abstracts: formulas by which one can define classes (Quine, 1972; 239). The logic that results runs easily to paradox, which tradition accommodated in dialectic. Asking what else Aristotle excluded from his doctrine of the syllogism, we come again to abstracts, for Aristotle was evidently not interested in a theory of classes, taking the view that it is primarily the individual thing that exists. In this spirit, Aristotle admitted species only through essences given by definitions, and hence as ideas in a weakly Platonic sense. 

On this note we find him in the Metaphysics (1.5) setting aside both 'so-called Pythagoreans,' and the 'so-called genera' which actually give workable local contexts for handling the complement! Modern philosophy has preferred to avoid these difficulties, following Aristotle in relying on ultimate individuals in the form of familiar individuals, atoms, or elements of sensation, but this leaves awkwardly unplaced universals like momentum and force on which so much turns in natural science. In explicit form and modern language this problem can be traced from the work of Francis Bacon, who wished to retrieve all that was found useful in human experience for the advancement of learning, in service of discovery. Bacon presented his work against a backdrop of tradition variously described as antiquarian, Freemason or Rosicrucian, but in any case palpably reaching into an antiquity greater than Europe's. With an approach properly suited to this burden, this exercise serves to elucidate the philosophical significance of Kant's dedication of his Critique to Bacon, and comes in this way to address, with unusual clarity, the difficulty of any approach to knowledge that can properly be called universal. Note that such modesty is specifically required in any quest for 2 the contextualising mind, so we have here a new venture in critical philosophy.

EPISTEMOLOGY 
A False Start. Francis Bacon has long been thought of as the original proponent of induction in science, a position decisively refuted by David Hume (1739). A new study by Howard Jones (1989) shows that Bacon's early position accompanied an enthusiasm for the atomism of Leucippus and Democritus, from which Bacon retreated into a more skeptical reserve, so that his later claims finished knowledge are notably modest. He distinguished between "particular and special habits of nature" and "her fundamental and universal laws which constitute forms," (Novum Organum, Aphorisms II, v), yet in establishing this distinction he warned that, "I have no entire or universal theory to propound. For it does not seem that the time is come for such an attempt," (Loc. cit., I, cxvi). His reviews of tradition covered in the main what Ryle (1949) called knowing how, techniques found serviceable in specific crafts. 

Kant dedicated his Critique of Pure Reason to Bacon, and then revised it. New in the second edition is a specific focus on objective knowledge, presented in the form Ryle (1949) posed as knowing that. This Hume never addressed: as Annet Baier (1991: 3) puts it, "Despite many references to other persons, and occasional rhetorical appeals to the reader to confirm the first-person singular findings, no appeals were made at any point to any pooling of data or to any really cooperative procedures for error detection or error correction." In this respect Hume had not refuted Bacon, but his skepticism was directed at the possibility of knowledge, and not any claims for scientific method.

Kant's Strategy
It remains doubtful whether Kant was successful in replying to Hume's skepticism (Steinhoff, 1989), but there is reason to think that this was not Kant's priority, although the most direct evidence is masked in translation. Kant concluded his Critique of Pure Reason with a doctrine of method, in which he addressed the problem of people seeking respectability or the appearance of goodness, rather than goodness itself. Addressing Prietly, a figure of little note in philosophy, he then brings his challenge to a head, on the point rendered by J.D.M. Meiklejohn in his edition of 1854 as conventionalism, but obscured by the scholarly Norman Kemp Smith (A748/B776) as mere duplicity. The older term addresses the tradition upheld by Hobbes, Lock and Hume alike (Green, 2003, Wilson, 2008), identifying law with the will of the sovereign, and it is clear that Kant's concern to refute this interpretation well preceded what is called the critical period of his philosophy (Kain 1998). Here is a new view of the continuity in Kant's thought, through a juridical line of argument, which is abstract enough to have application both to natural and social law. In the current context, this speaks to the ancient traditions of Egypt and Babylon, mediating between Asia and Europe, and is interestingly consistent with the Stoic root of Kant's logic. 

In the distinction between law and will Kant found a plausible analogy distinguishing the right to exclude others from one's property from the value of the possession itself (Moggach, 1998). This reading clarifies Kant's way with analogies, showing that they serve him on the ground called ontological, without requiring an explicit ontological foundation. In relation to Hume, it is fair to say that Kant accepted the common view that thought is in its broadest characterization an associative process, but examined rather more closely what this entails. Kant's analogies then show how associations can flow between diverse areas of thought. 

If he didn't take the formal step to analyzing conditions of possible association to match his relentless analysis of conditions of possible experience, it is clear enough that Kant was not interested in psychological investigations, for he thought very little could come of them (Brook, 2004: 3.1; see 3.5 below). Here it is important to realize that Kant's remarks had reference to psychology as rediscovered for the modern world by the reforming theologian Melanchthon (Sahakian, 1975: 27), envisaged as a 'science of the soul' serving as an adjunct to theology . Such endeavors Kant set aside with the ontological argument in theology, but they return to haunt us through the likes of Heidegger and Gadamer. Importantly, Kant's reserve does not apply to the Arabic psychology, or the work of Hypatia before them, marked by the invention known as the psychrometer.

Operationalism
Accepting Kant's agenda for philosophy and none of his conclusions was C.S. Peirce in the US, following Fichte in taking not pure but practical reason as his foundation. His term pragmatism was then appropriated by William James, and for a succession one must look elsewhere. The physicist Henri Poincaré argued that by acting in space and observing movement, the subject constructs a group of displacements which then provides the mathematical form in which questions of distance and velocity can be judged (Piaget, 1946: 539). Importantly, Poincaré gave the first formal analysis of what Bacon assumed in his concept of scientia operativa, after which P.W. Bridgman (1927, 1945) could speak of an operationalist philosophy of science. 

Ludwig Wittgenstein (1958) came to view mathematics as procedure, for a kind of abstract operationalism. Specifically, he took mathematics to be a language of pure syntax, and the operationalist implications are then felt in the theory of mind where calculations (Putnam, 1960), or operations over propositional representations (Churchland, 1981), are taken as the general form of procedure in the mind. Wittgenstein is further significant here for insisting that mathematics is a human invention, so that Bacon's hesitant approach to universal laws through form (Klein, 2003) falls away. Under Wittgenstein's considerable influence, well predating his books, form collapses into content, and mathematics into science, so that Quine (1953; 1960) could argue that the whole apparatus faces the test of experience, and Kant's distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments must be abandoned.

The Parting of the Ways
This is not an outcome acceptable to most mathematicians, but it is surely significant here that Kant himself made some non-trivial concessions in this direction. Thus us conjectured that the concept of number could be learned from the intuition of time, and in a consistent spirit, refused all argument with infinities. This position is variously known as intuitionist, finitary or constructive, and has been fashioned into a regular program in mathematics by L.E.J. Brouwer. Yet Kant's intuition of number is strictly an ordinal concept, and does not rise to the conception of measure and measurable quantities, which he thought of fundamental significance in natural science. By convention we speak here of natural numbers, which may now be set aside more explicitly as counting numbers, regarded at best as sustaining indexing system. 

In the matter of learning, Jean Piaget (1957) showed in a life-time of experimental work on human cognition that notions of classification and order appear early in development, in the foundation he called sensory-motor, which can reasonably be taken to be native to the functioning of our anatomy (Piaget, 1946; 1967). Yet the concept of measurable quantity he placed as a considerable further attainment, reached only where tradition has the age of reason, at around seven years (Piaget, 1968). Piaget (1968, 1970) was properly aware of Kant's stature and influence, and specifically interested in his influence on Einstein and Poincaré, but to follow his reading hear is a matter for another occasion. Here it is rather Freud's (1924) response to Kant which is of interest, for he claimed a developmental account of the attainment Kant had as the Categorical Imperative, which is to say, a conceptions of persons as equally and intrinsically worthy. Formally, Freud's account turns on an identity bound under a gender type, which can perhaps serve to found the more abstract concept of a 'one' or 'unit' whereby natural number can be refined into measure! Yet the familiar sense of being 'one of the boys' does not in fact rise to Kant's quite impartial schema of judgment! This surely asks for a properly critical examination of Freud's legacy.（essay代写)

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