THE DOOMSDAY SIMULATION ARGUMENT--论文代写范文精选

首先简要地介绍DA和SA,然后我将制定分析。这是一个事实,即人口正在增长。到2004年底,将会有大约80亿人类在地球上。根据一些估计,到2010年将有超过100亿人,在过去,一个现实的估计数量的人类曾经有过的，到目前为止是大约900亿。因此我们的人口在2004年代表近10%。

Abstract
There has been a revigoration in recent years of discussions surrounding two independent traditional philosophical topics, but from a new perspective, and a shared analytical ground. The two topics are: the end of the world, and scepticism about the external world; the common analytical ground is that of anthropic reasoning. More precisely, the topics I have in mind regard the probability we should assign to our species going extinct in a short time to come, and the probability we should assign to the hypothesis that we are living in a Matrix-like computer simulation. As regards anthropic reasoning, it is customary to understand it as the formulation of an anthropic principle; we will adopt a formulation due to John Leslie (1996, p. 190): “observers can most expect to find themselves in the spatiotemporal regions where most of them are found”. In this paper I will propose and discuss an argument (1) combining the ideas typical to two previously exposed arguments —the Doomsday Argument (DA) and the Simulation Argument (SA)—but (2) having, at the same time, a conclusion contrary to both those of the aforementioned arguments, which I will call ‘the Doomsday Simulation Argument (DSA)’. I will first briefly expose DA and SA, then I will formulate and defend the premises and analyse the conclusions of DSA.

Let us then start with DA (Carter 199?, Leslie 1996). It is a fact that the human population is growing. By the end of 2004, there will be about 8 billion humans on Earth. According to some estimations, by 2010 there will be more than 10 billion humans 1 , while in 2100 the human population will reach 27 billions (Leslie 1996, p. ?); as for the past, a realistic estimate of the number of humans that have ever lived so far is that of approximately 90 billion. Thus our population in 2004 represents almost 10 per cent of all the humans that have lived so far. Applying the anthropic principle to one’s position in time, we should judge as more probable that we are in a temporal niche where most of the observers are located. More exactly, if we suppose that we are among the earliest 10 per cent of all the humans that will ever have lived, then the number of all the humans that will ever have lived (past, present, and future) is 900 billion. This number may be reached by 2500, which means that in this case we should expect the extinction of the human species in a few centuries. If, on the other hand, we expect to survive for millions of more years, then we are among less than 0.00000001 of all humans. According to the anthropic principle we should consider as more probable that we are among the 0.1 than among less than 0.00000001 of all humans. Hence, we should assign a proportionally higher probability to DOOM SOON.

SA has been proposed by Nick Bostrom (2003), and is based on two assumptions. The first is that of substrate-independence of consciousness, which means that consciousness supervenes on any of a broad range of physical realizations, provided they implement the right sort of computational structures and processes. In other words, if one has the resources to implement sufficiently complex computational structures and processes, one is able to simulate consciousness2 . The second assumption is that if our technological progress will continue for a sufficiently long time with the same pace as so far, then humankind will attain a posthuman stage of civilisation --with a maximal level of technological capabilities that one can currently consider as consistent with all the physical laws and all the material and energy constraints of our universe—and will be able, due to an immense computing power, to simulate a huge number of entire ancestor civilisations, including the mental processes that are manifested within them. Given these assumptions, the basic idea of SA is expressible by the following question, as Bostrom puts it: “if there were a substantial chance that our civilization will ever get to the posthuman stage and run many ancestor-simulations, then how come you are not living in such a simulation?”

As I mentioned above, SIP states the implausible requirement that we should neglect the known fact that we actually are in 2004, and reason as if we were a random sample from the set of all the people who wil ever have have lived. The problem I see with WIP is that whilst it is certainly weaker, in the sense I explained, than SIP, there is a sense in which it is stronger than it. More exactly, in order for it to be usable in SA we have to assume not only that we don’t know which population we belong to (one of the many simulated ones or one of the few real ones), given the indistinguishability of simulated and real minds, but also, even if implicitly, that we don’t know which time we are actually living. SA shares with DA one important factor or variable: time. In DA we know the time slice we are ocuppying, and nevertheless prescribe indifference with respect to our temporal location. In SA time is also important; reaching a posthuman stage requires time, and so the more time we expect to survive, the more probable that a huge number of simulations are actually run. To accept WIP as a premise for a valid SA means, in effect, to accept that we don’t know that we are in 2004. But this should be, as far as I see, an assumption of ours for SA to get off the ground; the only thing we should have no information about is whether we are simulated or real, not whether we are at the beginning of the 21st century or not.

The basic assumption inherited from DA is that we know which time we are living, and that inherited from SA is that we don’t know which population we belong to. These basic assumptions correspond to Ku and Kv in MIP; Kt represents a supposition of DSA, just as DA’s supposition is that we are among the earliest faction x of all people who will ever have lived, and SA’s supposition is that there is a fraction x of observers who live in simulations. DSA’s supposition is a compound proposition, based on the following idea. If a posthuman civilisation contains some individuals interested and having resources to run a huge number of simulations, then it is more probable that these simulations are run with the purpose of evaluating the risks of extinction of the simulating species and the ways to avoid it by using the simulated species as the experimental subject of exposure to such unique risks, than with the purpose of entartainment. The uniqueness of these risks.

Now one may object to my argument that it is apparently inconsistent with betting odds based considerations. Our second conclusion prescribes my betting on not being in a simulation, but I proceeded from the assumption I share with Bostrom that there will be a huge number of simulations in the future, and so I have to agree that most of the people live in simulations. Therefore, if I bet on not being in a simulation, and I recommend it to everybody, then almost everyone will lose their bets if they follow my advice. In response, I should first point out that the second conclusion does not recommend betting on not being in a simulation given that one knows that that’s where most of the people are found, but betting on not being in a simulation given that one expects the human race to last for an extremely long time. Second, and more to the point, consider the following betting prospect:

Get (a) $ sum equal to your bet times the number of the years you expect the species to survive if not simulated, otherwise get (b) $ sum equal to your bet times the difference in number of years between the longest lasting and your actual matrix. I think this betting prospect is a correct representation of the situation, given our previously explained assumptions. Now consider the two hypotheses: everyone bets on not being in a simulation and everyone bets on being in a simulation. It is I think clear that the former case implies, with the assumption of an indefinitely high survival expectancy, a massive per capita monetary gain, while the latter a comparatively extremely low one.

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